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NOTE
Inhibiting Intrastate Inequalities:
A Congressional Approach to Ensuring Equal
Opportunity to Finance Public Education
Joshua Arocho*
The United States has exhibited a strong commitment to public education
throughout its history. The local control of education long associated with the
United States’ federal system, however, has led to extreme inequalities in edu-
cation finance within states. This reality, held constitutionally permissible by
the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, is a product of heavy reliance on local property taxation as a means to
fund schools. Although levying property taxes is a permissible state action to
promote local control of education, its unaltered use is archaic and ultimately
detrimental due to the United States’ growing income gap and corresponding
wealth segregation in the housing markets. Because federal and state court
litigation has produced an intractable and inequitable split in education policy
that remains unsolved by current federal- and state-led initiatives, this Note
argues that a conditional congressional grant of funds would serve as a new,
more politically feasible solution to this problem. By making federal funding
under the next reauthorization of the No Child Left Behind Act contingent on
states’ adoption of new school finance systems, particularly the Guaranteed
Tax Base, Congress can encourage states to give all communities an equal
opportunity to finance a high-quality education for their students, regardless
of the value of their taxable property.
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Introduction
“Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.”1
While this passage, unlike much of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
did not end up in the Bill of Rights,2 the United States nonetheless ascribes
no small value to education: after all, there are more colleges and universities
per capita in the United States than in any other developed nation.3 Yet our
commitment to education is not reflected in the structure of our public
school financing. Unlike many developed nations, the United States has a
decentralized primary and secondary education system that has led to frag-
mentation and inequality within and among states.4 Unfortunately, the
structure of the U.S. government does little to help the situation, as it defers
to the states to create school finance policies.
The clash between federal and state education initiatives finds its roots
in our federal system of government. The U.S. Constitution, via the Tenth
Amendment, delegates the duty to regulate public education to the states.5
In fact, every state in the union guarantees the right to an education in its
constitution, though the education clauses vary greatly in length and clarity.6
1. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at lvii, lix (2012) (em-
phasis added). This passage, key to the spread of higher education in the United States, is
engraved on the facade of the University of Michigan’s Angell Hall.
2. David G. Chardavoyne, The Northwest Ordinance and Michigan’s Territorial Heritage,
in The History of Michigan Law 13, 13 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. Hershock eds., 2006)
(“Its provisions established a structure of government that encouraged settlement of that vast
region and provided those settlers a startling set of civil rights that presaged the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Bill of Rights.”).
3. John U. Bacon, Three and Out: Rich Rodriguez and the Michigan Wolver-
ines in the Crucible of College Football 13 (2011).
4. David K. Cohen & James P. Spillane, Policy and Practice: The Relations Between Gov-
ernance and Instruction, 18 Rev. Res. Educ. 3, 6 (1992).
5. Id. at 5.
6. Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitu-
tions, 1997 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1, 3–4. For a discussion of the four categories of education
June 2014] Inhibiting Intrastate Inequalities 1481
Although states differ in their approaches to school finance, one source
of funding has proved ubiquitous: local property taxation.7 This system pur-
portedly maintains local control over education, but as the income gap con-
tinues to grow,8 funding schools with local property taxes has created severe
disparities in per-pupil funding between high-property-value school districts
and low-property-value school districts.9 On its face, local property taxation
seems to allow communities to fund their schools at whatever level they
deem appropriate; even if a low-property-value district greatly values educa-
tion and therefore imposes high taxes, however, the revenues of its higher
property tax rate cannot match the revenues that many high-property-value
districts can raise with lower tax rates.10
States have taken conflicting approaches in attempting to solve the issue
of disparate funding between school districts. Some state legislatures, like
New Jersey’s, have sought to enact laws aimed at creating parity between
district funding—a true attempt at equal education for all of their stu-
dents.11 Other states, however, have declared that education is not a funda-
mental right and continue to use the local property tax schemes that cause
such great inequalities.12 For example, in Lake County, Illinois, there re-
mains an enormous disparity in per-pupil funding: in 2010, Rondout Ele-
mentary spent $24,244 per pupil, whereas Taft Elementary spent a mere
$7,023.13
The assumption that schools that spend more money per pupil have
parents who care more about education is invalid. The local control ideals
behind property tax funding can give rise to the erroneous conclusion that
the parents in Rondout’s school district, for example, value education much
more than the parents in Taft’s school district. Proportionally, however,
Rondout parents pay less in property taxes than do Taft parents.14 Given the
increasing income gap in the United States,15 revenues raised via property
taxation are no longer an accurate metric of a community’s commitment to
clauses in state constitutions, see James W. Guthrie et al., Modern Education Finance
and Policy 86–87 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Daphne A. Kenyon, The Property Tax-School Funding Dilemma 4
(2007), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1308_Kenyon%20PFR%20Final.pdf.
8. Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the
Poor, in Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children’s Life
Chances 91, 100–01 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011).
9. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1973).
10. Id. at 64–65 (White, J., dissenting) (“In [low-property-value districts], no matter
how desirous parents are of supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to
do so through the use of the real estate property tax.”).
11. See discussion infra Section I.B.
12. See infra note 58.
13. Lisa Black, Spending Gap Between State’s Rich, Poor Schools Is Vast, Chi. Trib., Nov.
7, 2011, at 1, available at http://articles .chicagotribune.com/2011-11-07/news/ct-met-school-
funding-gaps-20111107_1_spending-gap-taft-s-district-poorest-schools.
14. See id.
15. Reardon, supra note 8, at 100–01.
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education. Perhaps this scheme accomplished its goal in the days where sin-
gle-room schoolhouses were funded completely by homogenous communi-
ties of farmers, blacksmiths, and carpenters. But today vast discrepancies in
personal wealth allow richer communities to shower their schools with re-
sources unimaginable to schools serving low-income students—and they
can do it at a much lower property tax rate. Parents in low-property-value
school districts simply do not have the resources to match those of their
high-property-value counterparts.16 This antiquated funding scheme is no
longer promoting local control over education; rather, it statutorily rein-
forces poverty by providing children in low-income families with fewer edu-
cational resources. As Cohen and Moffitt note, “[m]oney alone cannot cure
[the] weak schools, but a chief source of academic weakness in these schools
is the badly educated teachers and poor working conditions that inadequate
revenues . . . underwrite.”17
Several reform efforts have attempted—and failed—to address these
disparities. The struggle to eliminate such funding inequities faced its biggest
legal setback in 1973, when the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.18 The Court held that
funding education through local property taxes, despite the resultant dispar-
ities in per-pupil funding between neighboring school districts, did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because such
funding was rationally related to the legitimate government interest of en-
couraging local control over education.19 Rodriguez, though upholding the
Texas law, left open the question of whether “some identifiable quantum of
education is . . . constitutionally protected.”20
Nine years later, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court answered this question in the
affirmative by invalidating a statute that completely denied public education
to children of undocumented immigrants.21 Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan (who wrote a bitter dissent in Rodriguez22) referred to these chil-
dren as “victims” and argued that to deny them a basic education “imposes
a lifetime hardship” and deprives them of the opportunity to “contribute in
even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.”23 While this case was a
16. Oftentimes, they are even legally prohibited from raising such revenues due to uni-
form property tax caps. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. IX, § 3 (setting a cap on increases in local
property taxation). This bars property-poor districts from raising taxes to a level at which they
could collect the same amount of revenues for schools as their property-rich counterparts do.
17. David K. Cohen & Susan L. Moffitt, The Ordeal of Equality: Did Federal
Regulation Fix the Schools? 191 (2009).
18. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. Id. at 54–55.
20. See id. at 36.
21. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
22. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24.
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much-needed victory in federal court for proponents of educational oppor-
tunity, it set the standard for the right to education so low that it has proven
unable to overcome the trend set by Rodriguez.
By largely foreclosing federal litigation as a means to secure greater edu-
cational equity, Rodriguez and Plyler have forced some reformers to seek
redress in state court litigation on the one hand and in federal and state
legislative reforms on the other. After these federal equal protection claims
(known as the “first wave” of school finance lawsuits),24 two new waves of
litigation—equality challenges and adequacy challenges—surfaced in state
courts.25 These challenges are referred to as the second and third waves of
school finance litigation, respectively.26 Modern trends have shifted toward
adequacy challenges, which argue that every student is entitled to a basic
level of education. These challenges have generally been more successful
than equality challenges, which aimed to secure equal funding for all
schools.27 Such second and third wave cases have taken place in forty-five of
fifty states, and their mixed results have left poor students in certain states at
a severe competitive disadvantage.28 Looking to the future, some have pro-
posed a “fourth wave” of education litigation comprising federal quality-of-
education (adequacy) claims,29 but this is unlikely to produce meaningful
results due to the amorphous character of educational quality. Put simply,
courts lack the requisite expertise to prescribe standards for education.30
Without such knowledge, they can give only carte blanche authority to states
to determine the meaning of “adequate education,” which is the system
under which we already operate.31
Perhaps noting the mixed results in seeking equity in inputs (i.e., school
funding), the federal government has attempted to address educational ineq-
uities in outputs (i.e., student performance) through initiatives like the No
Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”). Although NCLB continued to partially
offset funding differences in high- versus low-income schools—as did its
predecessor, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(“ESEA”)—poor schools already counted on these dollars to educate low-
income students.32 And although the states have engaged in collective action
24. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 91–93.
25. Id. at 87.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See Michael A. Rebell, Courts and Kids: Pursuing Educational Equity
Through the State Courts 2–3 (2009).
29. Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: Pur-
suing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 989 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (“What
constitutes a ‘high quality’ education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be ascertained
by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards.”).
31. Even if courts had the requisite knowledge to do so, they would face significant sepa-
ration-of-powers problems. Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240, 1258 (Cal. 1992).
32. NCLB did significantly increase Title I funding, No Child Left Behind Is FUNDED,
House Education and the Workforce Committee (Jan. 2005), available at http://
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to form the Common Core State Standards Initiative, which exerts more
control over curricula than the federal government does with NCLB, the
Common Core is minimally funded and thus has not and cannot address
school finance issues.33
In light of these failed attempts at meaningful reform, this Note pro-
poses a new federal legislative solution to cure the ailment of school finance
inequity. History has made clear that Congress is the only remaining body
with the authority and ability to correct the inequities in education funding
caused by local-property-tax-based school finance schemes. By conditioning
a percentage of federal education funding under the next reauthorization of
NCLB on states’ adopting more equitable school finance systems, Congress
can encourage states to provide all communities an equal opportunity to
finance a high-quality education for their students, regardless of the com-
munities’ respective taxable property values. Part I argues that appeals to the
judiciary are counterproductive—federal litigation cannot be a vehicle for
change given the existing jurisprudence, and state court litigation has led to
an inequitable split in education policy. Part II contends that legislative re-
form efforts have been largely ineffective: states have struggled to address
school finance inequities through a patchwork of individual reform efforts,
current federal reforms are ineffective, and state-led collaborative programs
will fail because such initiatives lack the additional funding necessary to cure
financial inequalities. Finally, Part III argues that congressional action is the
only avenue available to address systemically school finance inequity, and
this Part therefore offers a legislative proposal wherein Congress would use
its spending powers to persuade states to create school finance schemes that
offer equal opportunity for all school districts to collect funds to finance
public education.
I. Rodriguez and the States’ Differing Conceptions of
Educational Equality
This Part discusses the Rodriguez decision and its ultimate effect: perpet-
uating a detrimental rift in state school finance policy that not only disad-
vantages poor students within states but also disadvantages students in states
with less progressive school finance systems. Section I.A outlines Rodriguez
and Plyler, concluding that Supreme Court jurisprudence has foreclosed fed-
eral litigation as a viable means to secure school finance equality. Section I.B
discusses the different positions state supreme courts have taken on state
archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov/archive/issues/109th/education/nclb/nclbfunded.htm,
but these increases failed to give low-property-value school districts the ability to tax them-
selves at a higher rate in order to escape the strings attached to Title I funding.
33. See Ctr. on Educ. Policy, Year 3 of Implementing the Common Core State
Standards: An Overview of States’ Progress and Challenges 14 (Aug. 2013) (“34 states
reported that finding adequate resources to support all of the necessary CCSS implementation
activities is a major (22 states) or minor (12) challenge.”), available at http://www.cep-dc.org/
displayDocument .cfm?DocumentID=421.
June 2014] Inhibiting Intrastate Inequalities 1485
constitutional rights to education, and it also examines many state legisla-
tures’ failure to address school finance inequality even in the face of court
orders. Section I.B ultimately suggests that even states that recognize the im-
portance of education cannot find equitable funding solutions.
A. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath
States control education by virtue of their police power. The Constitu-
tion vests in the states all authority not expressly vested in the federal gov-
ernment,34 and the power to control education is not expressly vested in the
federal government.35 States, in turn, have transferred much of their power
over education to counties, school districts, and individual schools.36 This
structure has helped perpetuate the educational inequalities that plague the
states. The Rodriguez decision—an immense blow for proponents of equal
educational opportunity—is instructive.
In Rodriguez, Texas’s school finance system used property taxes to pro-
mote local control over public schools. The Texas Minimum Foundation
School Program guaranteed that every school would get a minimum level of
funding from the state.37 If districts decided that they wanted to spend more
than the funding program allowed, they could do so by levying more prop-
erty taxes.38 This policy led to vast inequalities in per-pupil expenditures,
which prompted the Rodriguez plaintiffs to file suit under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Edgewood Independent School
District—a community composed of 90 percent Mexican Americans and 6
percent African Americans—took exception to this system because it did not
allow them to raise revenues comparable to those raised by more affluent
communities. The property tax rate in Edgewood was $1.05 for every $100
of property value as compared with the nearby Alamo Heights Independent
School District’s $0.85.39 But because per-pupil property values in Alamo
Heights were more than 10 times higher than those in Edgewood, Alamo
Heights was able to raise $333 per pupil compared to Edgewood’s scant
$26.40 Despite Edgewood’s demonstrated commitment to education—as evi-
denced by its higher property tax rate as compared with that of neighboring
Alamo Heights—it was not able to raise even one-tenth of the revenue that
Alamo Heights raised.
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim. The Court held that the Texas school finance system was
34. U.S. Const. amend. X.
35. See id. art I.
36. Cohen & Spillane, supra note 4, at 5–6.
37. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1973). Eighty percent
of funds for this program came from the state’s general treasury, and the remaining 20 percent
came from statewide property taxes, in an attempt to ensure that districts with the greater
ability to pay would do so. Id.
38. Id. at 9–11.
39. Id. at 12–13.
40. Id.
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constitutional because it was rationally related to the government objective
of promoting local control of public education.41 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the residents of property-poor districts were not members of a
suspect class because of the “large, diverse, and amorphous” nature of the
group42 and that education is not a fundamental right.43 This explains the
Court’s application of the rational basis test.
Rodriguez did leave the door open for subsequent educational equality
litigation by noting that there may be a constitutional right to “some identi-
fiable quantum of education.”44 The implication was a glimmer of hope for
equal education proponents and prompted another lawsuit, Plyler v. Doe.45
There, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute that com-
pletely barred children of undocumented immigrants from participating in
public education.46 The Court noted that denying these children access to
education would impose a “lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status.”47
Plyler, however, has not set a trend counter to Rodriguez. Although a
federally guaranteed right to a “quantum” of education exists, only a com-
plete denial of education violates that right.48 Thus, school finance systems
based on the use of local property taxation, despite their archaic and unbal-
anced approach to granting localities control over education, remain consti-
tutionally permissible. Because the Supreme Court has given no indication
that it will reverse course on the issue,49 reformers have turned to state
courts and legislatures.
41. Id. at 50–51. The Court specifically noted that “[i]t has simply never been within the
constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures . . . merely because the
burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political
subdivisions in which citizens live.” Id. at 54.
42. Id. at 28.
43. Id. at 37.
44. See id. at 36–37 (“Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of educa-
tion is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [the rights to
speak or vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in
Texas provide an education that falls short.”).
45. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
46. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
47. Id. at 223.
48. See id. at 230.
49. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–98 (1987) (holding that despite
statistical evidence that the death penalty was disproportionally administered to African Amer-
icans in Georgia, the petitioner failed to show that the legislature acted with a discriminatory
purpose or that it maintained the legislation because of the statistics showing a disproportion-
ate impact); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (noting the
Court’s reluctance to create new suspect classes); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979) (In order to run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment, the law must be made “at
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that unconstitutionality is
not presumed merely because the law may affect a greater proportion of one demographic
than another). Furthermore, it will be nearly impossible for future litigants to prove that any
state legislature enacted school finance legislation purposely to disadvantage the poor because
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B. The Failures of State Court Litigation and State-Based Legislation
Although state courts have occasionally been sympathetic to concerns
about school finance equity, they have been very inconsistent in recognizing
the need for such equity. After the limited success of Plyler, litigants turned
to state courts to seek greater equity under state constitutional provisions on
either public education or equal protection.50 States are about equally split:
some have accorded education the status of a fundamental right and have
consequently mandated more equal funding schemes, others have chosen
not to do so, and still others have declared that the state is required to give
every child an adequate level of education—the definition of which is rarely
specified.51
The line of Abbott decisions from New Jersey arguably represents the
most extreme example of a state supreme court enforcing school finance
equality. These cases, brought by the Education Law Center beginning in
1981, challenged New Jersey’s Public School Education Act of 1975, arguing
that its reliance on property taxes caused substantial inequalities in funding
between New Jersey school districts.52 Almost a decade later, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the Act violated New Jersey’s constitution, that it
must be revised to “assure funding of education in poorer urban districts at
the level of property-rich districts,” and that this funding could not depend
on a district’s ability to levy property taxes.53 This led to further litigation
over the New Jersey legislature’s failed attempts to ensure parity between
district funding.54 Although this was probably the single most sweeping state
court order regarding school finance, several other lawsuits have also
achieved some level of success in state court.55
of the prevalence of local property taxation in school funding nationwide. See, e.g., Kenyon,
supra note 7, at 4 (noting that in the 2004–2005 school year, 28.7% of all school funding
nationwide came from local property taxes).
50. See Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 93–99.
51. See 3 James A. Kushner, Government Discrimination § 6:19 (2012–13 ed. 2012).
52. Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 381 (N.J. 1985) (“The framework for plaintiffs’ con-
tention is that under the 1975 Act, for the past decade, the State has contributed no more than
about 40% of all school operating costs, and that the majority of all public school expenditures
is derived from local property taxes. Referring to the considerable evidence marshalled and
adduced in the course of discovery, plaintiffs contend that substantial property wealth dispari-
ties exist among school districts, that this has resulted in substantial disparities in per pupil
expenditures among districts, and that both of these disparities have widened since the 1975
Act went into effect.”).
53. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
54. See Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011). For a discussion of state legislatures’
failure to follow court orders, see infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (holding that substantial
funding disparities between school districts is unconstitutional); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v.
Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002) (holding that education is a fundamental right); Conn.
Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206 (Conn. 2010) (en banc) (holding
that state constitution requires substantially equal educational opportunities); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist.
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Conversely, several state constitutional challenges have failed. In Maine,
for example, students and school districts challenged the state’s School Fi-
nance Act because its cuts in state aid disproportionately harmed low-prop-
erty-value school districts. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine declined to
decide whether education is a fundamental right because the plaintiffs did
not present any evidence that the Act affected the quality of their educa-
tion.56 The court ultimately held the Act to be rationally related to the legiti-
mate government interest of subsidizing education while staying within the
limits of the state budget.57
Several other state supreme courts have arrived at similar conclusions,58
thus creating an interstate rift in educational equality jurisprudence. This rift
is especially problematic given recent research that stresses the importance
of improving our educational systems across the board to be able to compete
in a global economy.59 The disagreement over education’s status as a funda-
mental right significantly disadvantages students in states that do not recog-
nize it as such a right. This is especially true for students in poor, urban
school districts who are denied equal educational opportunities due to a lack
of funding available to their schools. The proposal outlined in Part III would
address this problem, both in states that do not recognize education as a
fundamental right and in states that do but have failed to implement truly
equitable systems.
State legislatures have also failed to address these issues, even in the face
of court-ordered relief. In Ohio, for example, the state supreme court or-
dered the legislature to reconfigure its school finance scheme because it did
not provide a “thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout
the state.”60 The state legislature failed to respond adequately, which
prompted additional court opinions—also unheeded—holding that the
school finance scheme was unconstitutional.61 The plaintiffs ultimately peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was summarily
denied.62 Education advocates encountered a similar situation in New York.
No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005) (holding that the funding scheme did not allow for
all schools to meet quality standard in state constitution).
56. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, Dep’t. of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1995).
57. Id. at 858.
58. See, e.g., Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho
1993) (education is not a fundamental right); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d
1178 (Ill. 1996) (education is not a fundamental right); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885
P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) (education is not a fundamental right).
59. See Nat’l Governors Ass’n et al., Benchmarking for Success: Ensuring U.S.
Students Receive a World-Class Education 9–19 (2008), available at http://www.achieve.
org/files/BenchmarkingforSuccess.pdf.
60. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (emphasis added).
61. DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d
993, 1020 (Ohio 2000).
62. DeRolph v. Ohio, 540 U.S. 966 (2003).
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There, a state court ordered more funding for state schools,63 and the legisla-
ture complied with the order by drafting a plan to phase in more appropria-
tions for education.64 During the 2008 recession, however, New York
defaulted on that promise.65
In short, states have largely failed to ensure educational equality for
their students. Even where states’ highest courts have declared the school
finance systems unconstitutional, such as in Ohio and New York, students
were ultimately still subjected to inequitable treatment. Given the federal
structure of the U.S. government, state action is necessary in promoting ed-
ucational equality, but such action alone has proved insufficient.
II. Nationwide Attempts to Address Educational Inequality
Individual states have not been the only actors attempting to increase
educational equity. This Part outlines attempts by the federal government, as
well as attempts by the state governments acting collectively, to exert control
over education policy. These reforms, because they either had only a small
impact on schools’ budgets or have lacked any meaningful funding mecha-
nisms, have been largely ineffective. Section II.A contrasts the federal gov-
ernment’s hands-off approach through the first half of the twentieth century
with its increased involvement in education beginning in the 1960s, and this
Section concludes that even the increased federal control has not signifi-
cantly reduced inequalities in intrastate school finance. Section II.B contends
that the states’ Common Core State Standards Initiative, while a valiant ef-
fort to standardize educational goals nationwide, lacks the funding and insti-
tutional capacity to address school finance inequities within states.
A. From Local Control to Federal Reform
Public education in the United States has undergone drastic changes
since its inception. The early paradigm of local control has given way to
greater federal control over national education policy. While localities still
have substantial control over education, the federal government’s expanded
role in setting education policy necessitates congressional action on the issue
of school finance.
In the early days of public education, schools were controlled almost
exclusively by localities. This phenomenon is particular to the United States,
as other nations have adopted more centralized control of education.66 Many
American schools had one room and one teacher for all students and were
63. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
64. Sharon Otterman, Last Days, Perhaps, for Group That Sued for Poor School Districts,
N.Y. Times (June 8, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/last-days-
perhaps-for-group-that-sued-for-poor-school-districts/?_r=0.
65. Id.
66. Cohen & Spillane, supra note 4, at 7.
1490 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:1479
funded entirely by local communities.67 Local control over public education
prompted the colonists to fund schools through local property taxation.68 By
the beginning of the twentieth century, however, states began to assert con-
trol over certain facets of education.69 Localities lost even more control over
their teachers in the 1950s and 1960s, when teachers’ unions became preva-
lent.70 Despite these changes at the state level, the federal government still
did not play a major role in setting education policy, and small, locally con-
trolled schools remained the norm.71
By the 1960s, this had changed. On the heels of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,72 liberals pushed for federal aid to schools that served disadvantaged
students but were blocked in Congress by Southern conservatives.73 Early in
his presidency, however, President Kennedy created a task force on educa-
tion, which recommended unprecedented federal aid to public schools.74
These recommendations resonated with President Johnson, whose attempt
to raise educational standards for low-income students broke the impasse
with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (now known as
the No Child Left Behind Act).75 Title I of this Act provided direct funding
to the states for public education based on a complex formula that takes into
account the number of students from low-income families.76
67. Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American
Society, 1780–1860, at 13–15 (1983). Until the late nineteenth century, local communities
were charged with setting qualifications for their teachers, resulting in low standards. Dan C.
Lortie, Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study 17 (2002). Since resources were scarce, par-
ents had substantial control over what their children learned in school because they were
responsible for choosing the books from which their children learned to read during the
school day. Kaestle, supra, at 17. This practice was described as a “jealously defended tradi-
tion.” Id.
68. Lortie, supra note 67, at 6–7. This form of taxation, they argued, was “highly visi-
ble” and “relatively painful,” so locals would think hard about how educational expenditures
would affect the resources available for the community’s other needs. Id. at 7.
69. One major loss of local control was power over teacher certification. Schools could
no longer hire as they pleased but rather were subjected to state certification standards, which
often involved the “completion of prescribed courses of study in colleges and universities.” Id.
at 18.
70. Id. at 21.
71. As late as 1956, there were almost 35,000 one-teacher schools in the United States. Id.
at 4.
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. For a discussion of conservative opposition to federal education funding, see gener-
ally Steven Teles, The Eternal Return of Compassionate Conservatism, Nat’l Aff., Fall 2009, at
107, 121–22.
74. Michael O’Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography 565 (2005).
75. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301
(2012)).
76. Id. Even though Democrats tried to minimize federalism issues by giving this money
directly to the states to distribute to local schools, this unprecedented federal intrusion into
education policy sparked strong opposition from Republicans in Congress. Sarah G. Boyce,
Note, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of the Federal Government’s
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This Act fundamentally altered the political landscape surrounding fed-
eral education policy. In one year, the government nearly tripled its expend-
itures on public education,77 and the continued support of the Act
throughout both the Nixon and Ford Administrations “embedded [federal
funding of education] in the fabric of American politics.”78 This sweeping
change prompted President Reagan to commission a group of researchers
and educators to put together a report on the status of education in the
United States. The commission presented its results in “A Nation at Risk,”
which found that U.S. schools had fallen far behind their international
counterparts—a potential explanation for the country’s then-waning
economy.79
“A Nation at Risk” started an ongoing conversation about strategies for
a national solution to the problems facing education. Many problems
emerged as roadblocks to education reform—the need for instant results led
to conflicting reform efforts, curricula were not rigorous enough to chal-
lenge students, teachers were not highly trained in their subject areas, and
accountability was generally lacking.80 Despite the increased inputs, schools
were not seeing gains of the anticipated magnitude,81 which ushered in a
wave of accountability-centered initiatives focusing on student test scores
known as Standards Based Reform.82
Throughout all of these reforms, the federal government continued to
give considerable discretion to the states, leading to increased incoherence in
curricula, assessments, and benchmarks. NCLB, for example, requires that
100 percent of students in all schools reach “proficiency” in math and read-
ing by 201483 but leaves the meaning of “proficiency” to the states.84 This
Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 Duke L.J. 1025, 1031–33 (2012). By the time the Act came
up for reauthorization in 1974, however, this opposition had mostly waned. Id. at 1033.
77. Boyce, supra note 76, at 1033–34.
78. Gareth Davies, See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to
Reagan 2 (2007).
79. Nat’l Comm’n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk 3–6 (1983), available at
http://datacenter.spps.org/uploads/SOTW_A_Nation_at_Risk_1983.pdf.
80. See generally Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer O’Day, Systemic School Reform, in The
Politics of Curriculum and Testing 233, 236–45 (Susan H. Fuhrman & Betty Malen eds.,
1991) (discussing barriers to school improvement).
81. See Cohen & Moffitt, supra note 17, at 182.
82. Id. at 185–86. For examples of standards based reform initiatives, see Goals 2000:
Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. § 5801 (2012); the No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301
(2012); the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009) (es-
tablishing the funding provision for Race to the Top); the Augustus F. Hawkins–Robert T.
Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-297 (1988), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012); the School-to-Work Opportunities Act
of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000) (expired Oct. 1, 2001, as provided by 20 U.S.C. § 6251
(2000)); 1996 Nat’l Educ. Summit, A Review of the 1996 National Education Summit
(1996), available at http://www.achieve.org/files/1996NationalEducationSummit.pdf.
83. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2006).
84. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B).
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attempt to overcome the fragmented nature of U.S. public education mis-
guidedly aimed to create “fifty coherent systems in which teaching and
learning followed standards and tests.”85 But this presented a problem: the
same fifty states that caused the incoherence in the first place were responsi-
ble for repairing it. Fearing the harsh penalties associated with NCLB,86
many states adopted low academic standards to make it appear that they
were in compliance without actually improving instruction.87 This delega-
tion of power even produced an ironic twist—because the states most be-
hind in educational outputs feared NCLB’s penalties the most, they set the
lowest standards,88 which enabled them to become the most academically
“proficient” states.
Despite federal reforms in other aspects of education, Congress has con-
tinued to defer to states in the context of school finance schemes. In light of
the popularity of local property tax funding schemes among the states,89
continued use of these schemes has served to reinforce the substantial ine-
qualities in education spending within states.90 The federal government re-
quires equal outputs from all schools, but it does so where educational
resources are inherently unequal, making it incredibly difficult for under-
resourced schools to keep up. Notwithstanding the federal government’s ef-
forts to increase educational equality, students in low-property-value school
districts are still subject to unequal inputs, with little meaningful improve-
ment in outputs.
B. The Common Core State Standards Initiative Lacks the Resources
Necessary to Address School Finance Inequities
State-led initiatives have also failed to grapple with the inequities in
school finance caused by the legacy of local control and local property taxes.
The Common Core State Standards Initiative aims to create a national cur-
ricular framework but makes no mention of school finance. Without ade-
quate funds, however, schools will not be able to implement the Common
Core evenly.
Because localities have a record of jealously guarding their control over
education, they have viewed federal mandates on education policy as intru-
sive. In many nations, the national government has ultimate authority over
85. Cohen & Moffitt, supra note 17, at 188.
86. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g).
87. Cohen & Moffitt, supra note 17, at 34.
88. See id. at 192; Tamar Lewin, States Found to Vary Widely on Education, N.Y. Times,
June 8, 2007, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/08/education/08scores.
html.
89. Local property taxes make up almost half of all school funding nationwide. Bruce J.
Biddle & David C. Berliner, What Research Says About Unequal Funding for Schools in America,
Policy Perspectives (WestEd, San Francisco, Cal.) 2003, at 23.
90. Id. at 2.
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education policy.91 Conversely, states retain power over most educational de-
cisions in the United States.92 This partly explains why many believe that the
Common Core State Standards Initiative could be more successful than the
federally mandated NCLB.93
As of September 2013, forty-five states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the Common Core Standards for English Language Arts and
Mathematics.94 These standards outline the skills that students are supposed
to attain by the end of each grade, giving states and teachers common guide-
lines for what they should be teaching.95 Proponents of the Common Core
believe that because the initiative is state-led and not federally mandated,
state governors may be more inclined to ensure the success of its implemen-
tation than they are to ensure that of NCLB, as the governors lack political
cover in the event that the Common Core fails.96
While the Common Core addresses the need for uniform education
standards, it does not address gross inequities in education finance. The
Common Core provides that the standards “ensur[e] all students, no matter
where they live, are well prepared with the skills and knowledge necessary to
collaborate and compete with their peers in the United States and abroad.”97
But without drastic reform of states’ school finance schemes, the Common
Core will not be able to achieve its goal.98 The National Governors Associa-
tion and the Council of Chief State School Officers could include a provision
requiring states that adopt the Common Core to agree to revamp their
school finance laws such that schools have equal opportunity to implement
the Common Core standards. This way, schools and districts that typically
operate on lower per-pupil expenditures will have a better chance at ad-
ministering the standards at the same level as those that typically operate
with more funds. As noted above, money alone is not a cure-all, but it can
91. Cohen & Spillane, supra note 4, at 6.
92. See id.
93. Willona Sloan, Coming to Terms With Common Core Standards, 16 Pol’y Priorities
4 (2010), available at http://www.ascd.org/publications/newsletters/policy-priorities/vol16/is-
sue4/full/Coming-to-Terms-with-Common-Core-Standards.aspx.
94. In the States, Common Core State Standards Initiative, http://www.corestan-
dards.org/in-the-states (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
95. See, e.g., Mathematics, Common Core State Standards Initiative, http://www.
corestandards.org/Math (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
96. In the case of NCLB, governors could simply shirk their responsibility to successfully
implement the program and instead blame the federal government for its failure. The Com-
mon Core, by contrast, is led by the National Governors Association and the Council of Chief
State School Officers, which brings accountability to the state level. See Nat’l Governors
Ass’n et al., supra note 59, at 24–25.
97. Frequently Asked Questions, Common Core State Standards Initiative, http://
www.corestandards.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
98. Education reformer Diane Ravitch has similarly commented on the Common Core’s
shortcomings, noting that “we have a problem of poverty, and the Common Core does noth-
ing to address that particular problem.” Exclusive—Diane Ravitch Extended Interview Pt. 1,
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.thedailyshow.com/ex-
tended-interviews/430100/playlist_tds_extended_diane_ravitch/430085.
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counteract some of the detrimental conditions that plague weak schools.99
For example, with more money, low-income school districts could pay
higher teacher salaries and thus attract more experienced teachers to their
classrooms. These teachers will have a better chance of effectively imple-
menting the Common Core than their less experienced counterparts. By ty-
ing a school finance rider to the Common Core, the National Governors
Association and Council of Chief State School Officers may be able to help
ensure that a child receives equal access to quality education no matter
where he lives in any given state.
Because the Common Core is still struggling to implement its education
standards and develop standardized tests,100 however, it may be reluctant to
address the additional, and much more arduous, task of reassembling the
majority of state school finance systems. Furthermore, the Common Core
has no funding mechanism to persuade state legislatures to create more eq-
uitable school finance schemes. Like NCLB, the Common Core aims for
equal outputs where resources are inherently unequal, thus disadvantaging
underresourced schools. For these reasons, Congress must take action for
the Common Core State Standards Initiative to experience success at scale.
III. Conditional Federal Appropriations Can Help to Eradicate
Educational Inequality
With federal constitutional challenges nigh impossible, state constitu-
tional rulings inconsistent, and current state-led education initiatives insuffi-
cient, congressional action represents the only means of obtaining
educational funding equity. State-led initiatives may be more politically fea-
sible given today’s heated political climate, but they lack the funding and the
scope of a congressional remedy. Therefore, this Part proposes that Congress
should incentivize states to change their school finance schemes by tying
federal grant money to the states’ use of a more equitable school finance
formula—the Guaranteed Tax Base—that subsidizes low-property-value
school districts that choose to tax themselves at high rates. Section III.A
details such a congressional solution and concludes that it is the most feasi-
ble avenue because of the politically divisive nature of state legislatures. Sec-
tion III.B outlines Congress’s constitutional authority to take such action
and finds that while there are weak federalism arguments against such ac-
tion, it should prove permissible under the current test for such claims, de-
spite recent scholarship attacking the constitutionality of similar spending
provisions in NCLB.
99. Cohen & Moffitt, supra note 17, at 191.
100. Leila Meyer, States Struggling to Secure Staffing and Resources for Common Core, THE
J. (Aug. 8, 2013), http://thejournal.com/articles/2013/08/08/states-struggling-to-secure-staff-
ing-and-resources-for-common-core.aspx.
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A. A Congressional Solution: Manipulating Local Property Taxation to
Provide Equal Educational Opportunity
While the federal government has significantly increased its role in na-
tional education policy,101 it has remained relatively deferential in the realm
of state operational budget appropriations.102 By making funding under the
next reauthorization of NCLB contingent on the use of more equitable
school finance schemes, however, Congress can have a significant impact on
school finance equity nationwide. This Section proposes a solution that, de-
spite its federal nature, respects the United States’ legacy of local control
over education. It does so by leaving a significant amount of discretion with
the states, thereby reducing the likelihood of a backlash against what some
may view as an overly intrusive federal initiative.
The vast majority of states employ local property taxation to provide
school districts with a minimal level of funding through Foundation Formu-
las.103 In such formulas, the state sets a “foundation level,” which is the min-
imum per-pupil funding that the state believes is required to provide an
adequate education.104 Next, the state mandates that each district pay a mini-
mum property tax rate, which is known as the “required local effort.”105
Many states, such as Michigan, also set a maximum property tax rate.106
Finally, if a district fails to raise the foundation level of per-pupil funding—
calculated by multiplying the district’s required local effort by its assessed
property valuation—the state makes up the difference.107 School districts
that raise more than the foundation level do not receive a state subsidy but
are generally permitted to keep any money they raise that exceeds the foun-
dation level.108
Although these programs guarantee low-property-value school districts
a minimum level of funding, the combination of property tax rate maxi-
mums and low property values prevents many low-property-value school
districts from funding their schools at a level higher than the minimum.
This is a significant problem because oftentimes parents in low-property-
value school districts are willing to tax themselves at higher rates to secure
101. See supra Section II.A.
102. Federal education spending has typically come in the form of block grants to states,
which the states distribute as they see fit. See, e.g., N.Y. State Archives, Federal Education
Policy and the States: 1945–2009, at 46–47 (rev. 2009), available at http://www.archives.
nysed.gov/edpolicy/altformats/ed_background_overview_essay.pdf.
103. See, e.g., Jennifer Imazeki, School Finance 101: State Funding Formulas, Policy Anal-
ysis for California Education (Apr. 8, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://www.edpolicyinca.org/blog/
school-finance-101-state-funding-formulas.
104. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 170–72.
105. Id. at 171.
106. Citizens Research Council of Mich., Report 371, Distribution of State Aid
to Michigan Schools 14 (2011), http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2011/rpt371.
pdf.
107. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 170–71.
108. Id. at 171–72.
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more funding for education,109 a willingness that reflects the American pub-
lic’s preference for more education spending.110 To foster equal opportunity
for low-property-value schools to raise money, it is necessary to depart from
Foundation Formulas.
To address this problem, Congress should create a new condition in the
next reauthorization of Title I of NCLB to appropriate additional funding
that is conditioned on states’ implementation of equal access programs, such
as the Guaranteed Tax Base, a system that provides state subsidies to inflate
artificially the property values in low-property-value school districts.111 Al-
ternatively, Congress could withhold current Title I funding from states that
choose not to implement such programs. This move would be a dramatic
shift in school finance policy. As of 2007, only three states used the Guaran-
teed Tax Base.112 Congress should use the National Minimum Drinking Age
Act, which withheld federal funds from states that chose not to raise the
legal drinking age to twenty-one,113 as a model to structure the new language
of Title I. That language would read as follows:
The United States Department of Education shall establish an Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity grant to be made available to the states. All states
choosing to implement an Equal Access formula for school finance, such as
a Guaranteed Tax Base, shall receive grant funding proportionate to the
amount of pupils in its education system, which shall amount to a 10%
bonus in Title I funding. All states not implementing such an Equal Access
formula forfeit the right to any bonus grant funding under this Section.
In the alternative, if Congress is unable to appropriate additional funds
under Title I, it could more closely follow the National Minimum Drinking
Age Act by withholding 10 percent of current Title I funding from states that
choose not to adopt a Guaranteed Tax Base formula. This would obviate the
need to seek additional appropriations in a political climate in which raising
taxes is difficult, if not impossible.
This plan relies on an established idea from education researchers and
state reform efforts—the Guaranteed Tax Base—as a basis for helping states
to develop equitable, yet flexible, funding formulas in response to the federal
mandate. Under a Guaranteed Tax Base, the state “guarantees” each school
district a certain amount of taxable property value per pupil and allows each
individual school district to set its own tax rate, subject to a mandatory
minimum.
109. See discussion supra Section I.A.
110. Rebell, supra note 28, at 90 (“State and national polls have revealed a consistent
willingness of large majorities of the American public (59–75 percent) to pay higher taxes for
education, especially if there is a reasonable expectation that the money will be spent well.”).
111. Other forms of equal access programs that operate in a similar manner are percent-
age equalizing programs and power equalizing programs. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at
173–74.
112. Deborah A. Verstegen & Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of School Finance Poli-
cies and Programs: An Overview, 34 J. Educ. Fin. 216 (2009).
113. National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
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For school districts with assessed property valuation below the state-set
guaranteed tax base, the state subsidizes the balance. For example, if the state
sets the guaranteed tax base at $250,000 per pupil and the school district has
only $70,000 of taxable property per pupil, then the state must subsidize the
district for the revenue that would be generated under the district’s chosen
tax rate with the additional $180,000 of taxable property per pupil. Like the
Foundation Formulas, the Guaranteed Tax Base thus has the advantage of
guaranteeing each school district a minimum level of per-pupil funding, but
it also enables low-property-value school districts to raise more than the
foundation level if they choose to tax themselves at a higher rate. Moreover,
this plan does not force the equalization of school funding but rather leaves
each school district with a question to be addressed at the local level: How
much do we value education? By not mandating equalized spending between
low-property-value and high-property-value districts, states should not face
opposition from more affluent communities that do not want the quality of
their children’s education to be affected by a leveling down of education
spending.114
Equal opportunity formulas such as the Guaranteed Tax Base do, how-
ever, have a practical problem: allowing school districts to set their own tax
rates could force states to subsidize unwieldy budgets.115 If extremely low-
property-value districts were to approve of very high tax rates, states may
not have enough money in their education budgets to subsidize all low-
property-value school districts. To solve this problem and to make the state
education budget more predictable, states could implement control mea-
sures, such as sliding scales for state aid. Keeping with the example above, a
state could decide that a school district may participate in the guaranteed tax
base program if it levies a minimum rate of 20 mills (2%) of property tax,
for which the foundation level of per-pupil funding would be $5,000 (such
that any school district taxing at 20 mills would be guaranteed $5,000 per-
pupil in state funds). If school districts decided to tax higher than 20 mills,
the state could set the guaranteed tax base at $250,000 per pupil for up to
the first 20 mills of property tax levied, $230,000 for the next 5 mills,
$210,000 for the next 5 mills, and so on. Under this system, a school district
with taxable property of $70,000 per pupil with a 28-mill property tax
would raise $1,960 per pupil before state subsidies. For the first 20 mills, the
state would then subsidize the school district for $180,000 of taxable prop-
erty, thus giving the district an additional $3,600 per pupil. For the next 5
mills, the state would subsidize the school district for $160,000 of taxable
property, thus giving the district another $800 per pupil. Finally, for the last
3 mills, the state would subsidize the district for $140,000 of taxable prop-
erty, thus giving the district another $420 per pupil, for a grand total of
$6,780 per pupil from state and local sources. For charts of this sliding scale
114. See William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & Pol. 607,
612–14 (1996) (discussing California Proposition 13 and the Serrano decision, which together
resulted in an across-the-board drop in education spending in California’s public schools).
115. See Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 175.
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and its application to the example’s hypothetical district, see Appendices A
and B.116
As the mill level increases and the corresponding guaranteed tax base
shrinks, fewer districts will qualify for subsidies, which will limit the burden
on the state coffers. Setting these types of cost-predicting plans will, of
course, fall within the discretion of each individual state, as Congress is in
no position to judge the financial situation of every state. States would not
be limited to sliding scales of aid in their cost-predicting plans—they would
have broad discretion to implement other measures, such as setting a time-
line on voting for tax rate elections to increase long-term predictability of
the state budget and creating accountability measures to ensure that state aid
is well spent.
To avoid abuse by recalcitrant taxpayers or state legislators who want to
circumvent the law, every state’s Guaranteed Tax Base must be subject to a
mandatory minimum per-pupil funding level in order to receive federal
funding. This minimum funding level can be based on a federal study aimed
at finding the “amount of money per pupil necessary to guarantee a mini-
mally adequate education.”117 This funding level, of course, must be adjusted
for factors such as cost of living. This cost study will guarantee a minimal
level of uniformity and will prevent states from setting low foundation levels
and thus harming low-property-value or reluctant-to-tax school districts.
Furthermore, to safeguard against other potential abuses, such as states set-
ting meaninglessly low guaranteed tax bases, Congress should include an
enforcement mechanism—Department of Education oversight or a private
right of action, for example—to address states’ bad-faith manipulations of
the system.118
Making federal funding contingent on a state’s compliance with federal
requirements has proved successful in the past. Congress passed the National
Minimum Drinking Age Act in 1984, making 5 percent of federal highway
funds contingent on setting the minimum drinking age at twenty-one.119
Early research showed an immediate drop in alcohol-related deaths.120 The
federal mandate effectively quickened the pace at which states made twenty-
one the legal drinking age, which accelerated these life-saving effects.121 The
116. In order to show the effects on the state subsidy at tax rates higher than 28 mills,
Appendices A and B are extended as though the example district taxed itself at 65 mills, with
the guaranteed tax base descending according to the established pattern.
117. Matthew G. Springer et al., History and Scholarship Regarding United States Education
Finance and Policy, in Handbook of Research in Education Finance and Policy 3, 10
(Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske eds., 2012). See generally Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at
171, 294–301 (discussing a variety of contemporary cost-modeling strategies).
118. This enforcement mechanism would only apply to bad-faith attempts at implement-
ing the guaranteed tax base program and would not extend to other areas of education policy.
119. National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
120. Jeffrey A. Miron & Elina Tetelbaum, Did the Federal Drinking Age Law Save Lives?,
Regulation, Spring 2009, at 10, 10, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/seri-
als/files/regulation/2009/2/v32n1-1.pdf.
121. See id. at 12.
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federal government could use spending legislation similarly to accelerate the
effects of more equitable school finance schemes. If all states adopt equal
access programs, a move that Congress’s new law will encourage, the effect
will be to give every child an opportunity to attend a well-funded school,
regardless of his socioeconomic status or the wealth of his school district.
This plan offers the political feasibility missing from new financing
schemes at the state level. State legislators representing property-rich subur-
ban school districts have no incentive to restructure drastically the state’s
school finance system in the name of equity—if they lost funding for their
schools, their reelection would be at risk. The plan addresses this problem by
giving such legislators political cover, for if they decide against restructuring
the state’s school finance system, the state will lose federal money. In this
sense, congressional action will dampen the politically divisive effects of re-
structuring school finance schemes.
B. Congressional Authority to Address School Finance
Congress’s power to create stipulations on local property taxation in
school finance derives from the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitu-
tion.122 In South Dakota v. Dole,123 the Supreme Court endorsed the type of
congressional action this Note proposes. The Court noted that “objectives
not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’ may never-
theless be attained through the use of the spending power and the condi-
tional grant of federal funds.”124 A law that conditions the receipt of federal
funds in exchange for manipulating the use of local property taxes to fund
education would meet the four-factor test espoused in Dole. Setting out this
test, the Court held (1) that the restriction on receipt of federal funds must
help to promote the general welfare; (2) that Congress must unambiguously
condition federal funds such that states can knowingly exercise their choice
to comply or lose the funding; (3) that conditions on federal grants must
impact issues of national concern; and (4) that Congress may not use its
taxing and spending powers to coerce states to engage in unconstitutional
behavior.125
Fostering equality in educational opportunities for all students clearly
promotes the general welfare. Allowing for more equal educational inputs
across school districts will give students a more equal opportunity for suc-
cess in whichever of their state’s districts they attend school. Furthermore,
poor and minority children often have the least access to educational re-
sources.126 Minorities in the United States typically perform worse than mi-
norities in other countries and will make up the majority of school-aged
122. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
123. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
124. Id. at 207 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
125. Id. at 207–08.
126. The Education Trust, Funding Gaps 1 (2006), available at http://www.edtrust.
org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/FundingGap2006.pdf.
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children by 2023.127 As a result, increasing their educational opportunities is
essential to the success of the U.S. economy. In Dole, the Court further
noted that courts should substantially defer to the judgment of Congress
about what promotes the general welfare,128 which establishes that federal
legislation is appropriate in the context of this proposal.
Congress next must explicitly inform states that the receipt of federal
funds is contingent on modifying their school finance schemes to provide
more equal opportunity for school funding. As outlined above, Congress can
easily comply with this requirement. Its alteration of Title I will unambigu-
ously inform states that if they fail to take action, they will miss out on a
source of federal funding for education.
It is also clear that K–12 education is an issue of national concern. In
today’s globalized economy, governments constantly call for international
benchmarking in order to compete with the rest of the developed world.129
Furthermore, the U.S. government has been attempting to solve educational
inequalities for decades,130 which clearly shows that education is a matter of
national concern. By conditioning Title I funds on the use of more equitable
school finance formulas, Congress furthers Title I’s original goal of improv-
ing educational opportunities for the poor.
Finally, neither changing school finance schemes generally nor specifi-
cally adopting the above plan is unconstitutional coercion. States have tradi-
tionally controlled education and its financing, and there is no
constitutional issue with a state changing its own school finance scheme.
Michigan, for example, has recently considered revising its school finance
laws.131
Subsequent case law and scholarship addressing the Spending Clause
have questioned the constitutionality of federal education spending pro-
grams, such as NCLB, under a theory of unconstitutional coercion. Michael
Barolsky contends that NCLB is “unconstitutionally coercive and violates
state sovereignty by forcing states to adopt [its] broad, controversial educa-
tion philosophy or lose billions of dollars in federal education funding.”132
Specifically, he argues that by bundling together several distinct compo-
nents, including testing and reporting requirements as well as teacher-train-
ing requirements, NCLB forces states to either accept all of the many
components or risk losing all Title I funding for shirking even one of
127. Nat’l Governors Ass’n et al., supra note 59, at 14–15.
128. 483 U.S. at 207.
129. See Nat’l Governors Ass’n et al., supra note 59, at 5.
130. See supra Section II.A.
131. Paul Egan & Chastity Pratt Dawsey, Education Funding Proposal Allows School Choice,
More Online Learning, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 18, 2012, at 1A, available at http://
www.freep.com/article/20121118/NEWS15/311180296/Education-funding-proposal-allows-
school-choice-more-online-learning.
132. Michael D. Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole Frees States
from the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 725, 728
(2008).
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them.133 Barolsky also maintains that NCLB violates state sovereignty by co-
ercing states into adopting specific legislation to comply with its terms.134
Finally, he notes two recent education cases that gave lower courts pause
regarding the unconstitutional coercion test and its application to educa-
tion.135 In both cases, the plaintiffs complained that if they were found
noncompliant, they stood to lose 100 percent of funding under the title at
issue.136
The plan proposed here, however, suffers from none of these deficien-
cies. First, unlike NCLB as a whole, it only addresses school finance and
resists mandating changes in other areas of education policy, such as testing
or teacher training. Second, the plan leaves a significant amount of discre-
tion to the states by allowing them to adopt sliding scales and accountability
measures and by mandating only that they set a bare-minimum foundation
level below which schools cannot be funded. Finally, by limiting the scope of
the financial benefit or burden to only 10 percent of Title I funding, the plan
avoids putting states in the difficult position of choosing between adopting a
disagreeable policy and losing all available funding under Title I.137
The Supreme Court recently bolstered the unconstitutional coercion test
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.138 Professor
Pasachoff discusses the plurality’s three-prong test at length, noting that the
NFIB Court was the first to strike down a congressional provision—here,
the Medicaid expansion of the Affordable Care Act—as unconstitutionally
coercive under the Spending Clause.139 The offending provision, “[i]nstead
of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States that will not accept the
new conditions . . . threatened to withhold [a significant portion of] those
States’ existing Medicaid funds.”140 First, the plurality declared, courts must
determine whether the condition threatens to take away funds from a pro-
gram that is independent from the program to which the condition is at-
tached.141 Second, if the court does find that the condition influences an
independent program, courts must ask if states had sufficient notice at the
time they accepted the original funds that this condition may be imposed in
the future.142 Finally, if the states weren’t given sufficient notice, the court
133. Id. at 736–37. The Secretary of Education is given wide discretion to determine what
proportion of Title I funding to withhold from noncompliant states. See id. at 738–40.
134. Id. at 740.
135. Id. at 744–45.
136. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
possibility of the government withholding 100% of IDEA funding); Connecticut v. Spellings,
453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 492–93 (D. Conn. 2006) (discussing the possibility of the government
withholding 100% of Title I funding).
137. See supra Section III.A.
138. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (plurality opinion in part).
139. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal
Education Law, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 577, 579–80 (2013).
140. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (plurality opinion).
141. Pasachoff, supra note 139, at 583.
142. Id.
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must ask if the amount at stake constitutes “economic dragooning.”143 If the
taxing and spending law does not offend all three of these prongs, then the
law is constitutional.
Even assuming arguendo that the plan outlined above fails the first two
prongs of the NFIB test, it would still withstand the Court’s coercion inquiry
because it does not amount to economic dragooning. Under the first prong,
one could arguably consider the 10% conditional Title I funds as merely a
new facet of the original Title I program. After all, Title I was originally
implemented to improve the educational opportunities of disadvantaged
students, and the switch to a Guaranteed Tax Base system does exactly that.
Conversely, if courts consider this program independent from Title I, they
must move to the second prong. Given the sweeping change this plan would
impose on school finance, courts would be highly unlikely to rule that states
were given sufficient notice that they would be subject to such a condition in
1965 when they agreed to accept a block grant under ESEA. But even if the
plan is independent from Title I and even if the states were not given suffi-
cient notice of this potential change when they originally consented to
ESEA’s terms, the plan survives NFIB scrutiny because it does not amount to
economic dragooning. In NFIB, the Medicaid expansion qualified as eco-
nomic dragooning because the penalty for noncompliance amounted to
about 10% of the average state budget.144 For the average state in 2008–2009,
however, Title I funding in its entirety amounted to only 0.8% of its
budget,145 meaning that this plan only affects 0.08% of the average state
budget. This figure falls far below the 10% deemed unconstitutionally coer-
cive in NFIB, and it even falls below the percentage in Dole, where the law
implicating 0.19% of South Dakota’s budget was deemed “relatively mild
encouragement,” not unconstitutional coercion.146 States may claim that this
plan will require them to spend additional money, but as Pasachoff notes,
“[i]f the amount at stake in Title I is itself not coercive . . . then it would not
matter for coercion purposes how much the state would have to spend . . . since
it could just turn down the . . . funds.”147 Under a similar analysis, Pasachoff
concludes that threatening to withhold 100% of Title I funds would not
amount to unconstitutional coercion,148 thus bolstering the idea that a 10%
condition on Title I would be constitutionally permissible.
143. Id.
144. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (plurality opinion).
145. Pasachoff, supra note 139, at 622.
146. Id. at 624.
147. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 621–29.
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Finally, in the wake of Horne v. Flores149 and United States v. Windsor,150
persuading state legislatures to make such a radical change in school finance
programs may raise significant federalism concerns. Because of the long-
standing tradition of local control of education in the United States, critics
will argue that Congress should not interfere in an area of traditional state
competence by setting national education policy. Furthermore,
“[f]ederalism concerns are heightened when [nonstate decisionmaking] has
the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities.”151 While the Horne
decision involved spending priorities related to the funding of English Lan-
guage Learner programs and the Court ultimately remanded the case back to
the district court to determine whether Arizona had complied with a previ-
ous consent decree,152 the same principles apply: by tying funding in NCLB
to the use of a certain school finance scheme, the federal government would
be usurping the states’ role in setting budget priorities and education policy.
The argument that a congressional push to fund schools with a Guaran-
teed Tax Base dictates spending priorities ignores this plan’s safeguards for
local control. As discussed supra Section III.A, states will be given broad
deference in setting the limits on their Guaranteed Tax Base programs. If a
state has financial concerns, it can set up a steeper sliding scale than that
discussed above, it can set the original guaranteed tax base lower, or it can
make any other changes needed to tailor the program to the state’s individ-
ual needs, subject to the mandatory-minimum funding and good-faith re-
quirements. By giving states such wide deference on how to implement the
program, Congress leaves the states in control of education policy at the
macro level while simultaneously putting the onus of setting specific educa-
tion finance levels on the very institutions on which it originated—local
school districts.
Conclusion
Over the past 200 years, the United States’ federal system and its com-
mitment to education have ceased to coexist peacefully. Although the recent
push in Standards Based Reform has shied away from the notion that educa-
tional inputs are the root of educational inequalities in the United States,
these input inequalities result in varied educational opportunities for stu-
dents based solely on their zip code. Given the Common Core’s push to
149. 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2595–96 (2009) (discussing the federalism concerns inherent in the
federal government’s involvement in education policy).
150. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (noting that because marriage, like education, is tradi-
tionally a state-controlled institution, the federal government “has deferred to state-law policy
decisions with respect to domestic relations”).
151. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2593–94.
152. Id. at 2607. Specifically, the Court noted that increased funding is not the only path
to taking “appropriate action” under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and admon-
ished the appellate court for not considering other factors, such as Arizona’s new English
Language Learner instructional methodology, the enactment of NCLB, and the school’s struc-
tural and organizational reforms. Id. at 2595–606.
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abolish such inequalities and adequately prepare all students for “success in
college and careers”153 regardless of where they live, inequalities in inputs
must not be allowed to persist. Because closing the gap in per-pupil expend-
itures within states is an essential step in closing the achievement gap and
preparing our students for success in today’s global economy, and because
the Common Core lacks resources and is already struggling to effectively
implement its standards, Congress must act to persuade states to adopt more
equitable school finance schemes. By tying federal funds under the next
reauthorization of NCLB to states’ use of a Guaranteed Tax Base system,
Congress can incentivize states to provide true equality of educational op-
portunity to all schools while avoiding the federalism issues associated with
a national system of school finance.
153. Common Core State Standards Initiative, http://www.corestandards.org/ (last visited
Dec. 31, 2013).
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Appendix A:
Hypothetical Guaranteed Tax Base Sliding Scale
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Appendix B:
State and District Contributions Under Hypothetical
Guaranteed Tax Base Sliding Scale
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